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Abstract
Propaganda is an un-avoidable feature of modern society. It has been identified with
multiple global conflicts, oppressive totalitarianisms, and misinformation campaigns
that threaten democracy. Despite the world’s popularization in discourse, it remains
somewhat ambiguous, begetting many attempts to define and analyze the concept of
propaganda. This project contributes to this effort by examining how propaganda involves itself in logical forms of reasoning and judging its value from an epistemological
perspective. Propaganda can be interpreted through logically argumentative forms. These
arguments are always improper, involving an invalid form or false proposition; therefore,
propaganda cannot directly provide real knowledge. Nevertheless, it succeeds in leading
its audience to adopt a belief or action through nonlogical means and the manipulation of available information. An individual may identify and avoid propagandas that
rely solely on nonlogical techniques by working to identify their apparent logical flaws,
although resisting them altogether still appears to be a major challenge. Unfortunately,
propagandas that manipulate available information are far more difficult for an individual to avoid, due to their leveraging of the propagandee’s lack of knowledge held by
the propagandist and inability to find the truth themselves. The only way to effectively
limit the negative epistemic influence of these propagandas may lie at the societal level,
but specific solutions remain a subject of debate and additional research.

I

tems called “propaganda” have had an influential role in the history of the last century. In one infamous instance, the Nazi regime used propaganda to mobilize the German nation to initiate one of the most destructive and atrocious wars the world has
ever seen (Appendix 1-a). More recently, the Russian state has been accused of using it
to polarize politics in the United States in advance of the 2016 election (Appendix 1-d).
Democratic governments have not abstained from sponsoring its production either, as
evidenced by the United States’ mobilization for World War I and contemporary controversies over the content of state textbooks (Appendix 1-e). Upon closer examination,
propaganda does not appear to be the exclusive product of political entities, nor is it only
involved in major events: indeed, it seems that it is proliferated by a variety of public and
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private organizations and can target activities that seem relatively inconsequential,
such as the decision of a consumer to buy one product over another.1
This apparent pervasiveness of propaganda, especially in relation to movements that
look to be dangerous to the overall wellbeing of society, is what motivated me to begin
this project. I chose to look at these things called propaganda from the perspective of
epistemology, the study of knowledge, and to evaluate their effect on an individual’s
ability to gain knowledge, something I consider to be basically and intrinsically good.
To this end, I looked at how propaganda engages in forms of logical argumentation,
as I consider logical reasoning to be the most reliable tool at an individual’s disposal
for arriving at true conclusions from available information, for gaining knowledge.
In doing so, I have developed a unique definition for propaganda—which is compatible with many pre-existing definitions—based in the necessarily improper format
of its logical argumentation, and thereby its inability to give its audience knowledge
directly. This definition can increase the capacity of an individual to identify, analyze,
and potentially avoid certain kinds of propaganda, namely those with inherent logical flaws. There still exist other forms, however, that are more evasive, thanks to their
manipulation of information made available to their audience and internal logical
consistency, calling for more research into the subject of how these propagandas may
be mitigated.

Background and Challenges to Defining Propaganda
To begin talking about propaganda, we must first establish a working understanding
of the concept. Unfortunately, “propaganda” is a woefully ambiguous and sensationally charged term, so much so that some researchers have suggested that it should be
avoided in analytical contexts (Marlin, 2013, p. 4). Some of this ambiguity can be
traced in the word’s complicated history.
Examples of propaganda can be found as far back as the Peloponnesian War, but the
modern term did not appear until the 17th century, when the Latin propagare was
used by the Catholic Church to describe missionary efforts to spread, or propagate,
the Catholic faith (Miller, 2005, p. 9). By the 19th century, the word was still rather
obscure in the Anglosphere, but carried fairly neutral connotations when applied,
with it being used to describe ideological crusades and campaigns to promote public
health alike (Miller, 2005, pp. 10- 11). Social, political, and technological developments by the turn of the century allowed for the creation of the first true mass media
campaigns, which were used extensively during World War I by the German, British,
and American governments to facilitate military and industrial mobilization (Badsey,
2014). The war had the effect of popularizing the word “propaganda” and, given the
efficacy of these campaigns, legitimizing the careers of those involved in mass media
persuasion (Miller, 2005, pp. 11-13).
1: This is not to suggest that all marketing is propaganda, though some of it is. This distinction is
clarified in the Stipulative Definition section. For one example of marketing that is propaganda (Appendix 1-f ).
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This period also laid the groundwork for the word’s pejorative connotations in English. “Propaganda” was used to describe German information efforts, which were denounced as malicious and deceitful, while the Allies avoided publicly applying the
word to their own efforts, instead describing them as educational and informative
(Miller, 2005, pp. 13-14). There was an attempt in the 1920s by some wartime propagandists, many of whom had now turned to working for the private sector, to recover
the term’s more neutral meaning, but these efforts failed (Miller, 2005, p. 15). Terms
such as “marketing,” “advertising,” and “public relations” came to be used to describe
their activities, while “propaganda” came to be associated with political and governmental activities, even though this private sector work used remarkably similar tactics
(Miller, 2005, pp. 18-19). The extensive use of propaganda by the German Nazis during World War II and the Russian Communists during the Cold War seems to have
solidified the word’s negative connotations throughout the English-speaking world.
This turbulent history produced a variety of definitions of propaganda. Edward Bernays, an early pioneer and proponent of propaganda in the 1920s, described propaganda as the means of communicating the complex views and information of an
organization or individual to others in a more consumable form, as a part of popular
discourse (Bernays, 2005, pp. 38-39). He argued that propaganda was a practical necessity for a modern democratic society, as without it, the discourse at the foundation
of democratic decision-making would be unworkable, because people lack the means
needed to properly hear and digest the complete views of competing interests (Bernays, 2005, pp. 37-38). According to him, propaganda is actually beneficial to society,
so long as propagandists followed a proper code of ethics (Bernays, 2005, pp. 69-70).
By contrast, Jacques Ellul, a French philosopher and sociologist that wrote in the
1960s and 70s, saw propaganda as an inevitable yet distinctly negative sociological
phenomenon within a mass society, defined in a non-exhaustive way as “a set of methods employed by an organized group that wants to bring about the active or passive
participation in its actions of a mass of individuals, psychologically unified through
psychological manipulations" (Ellul, 1973, p. 61). Additionally, for Ellul, only successful propaganda is real propaganda (Ellul, 1973). It must totally encircle each individual’s ability to find information, exercising every medium available, becoming
constant, unignorable, and unchallenged, as anything less would fail in subjugating
the individual to the propagandist (Ellul, 1973, pp. 9-14).
Disagreement over a proper definition of propaganda remains in the 21st century, especially over the necessary characteristics of propaganda. Such controversial or vague
elements of definitions include: whether or not propaganda must be produced or
spread by some intention; the relationship propaganda may have with truth; whether
or not propaganda is necessarily beneficial or detrimental to a society; whether or not
propaganda has some inherent ethical skew; the degree to which propaganda may
involve actual alterations to an individual’s environment or condition; the acceptable
subject matter of propaganda (e.g. whether commercial marketing is a form of propaganda, or if it should be treated as a separate category, with propaganda restricted to
Published by KnightScholar, 2021
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the political realm); the audience for propaganda (whether it must target an entire
society, a group, or just one individual); whether true propaganda must be successful
or not; whether propaganda must seek to inspire action, or if shaping attitudes and
beliefs is sufficient; and, whether propaganda must involve a large, organized campaign, or if more singular efforts can be included.2
Considering these controversies is a significant task when discussing propaganda.
Should one draw a conclusion about a more restrictive definition of propaganda,
another may inappropriately generalize that conclusion to a broader definition. However, resolving many of these controversies would be time consuming and of limited use for the purposes of more narrow research. Therefore, I seek to establish a
somewhat broad definition for propaganda that aids an epistemological analysis, one
that hopefully accommodates the entire set of things that could legitimately be called
propaganda in its modern sense by avoiding qualifiers that should be the focus of
other types of inquiry into the subject (e.g. ethical inquiries). The definition that I
seek to establish here draws inspiration most directly from Randal Marlin’s definition,
which describes propaganda as “the organized attempt through communication to affect belief or action or inculcate attitudes in a large audience in ways that circumvent
or suppress an individual’s adequately informed, rational, reflective judgement. (Marlin, 2013, pp. 12-13). Jason Stanley also provides an inspirational characterization of
propaganda, describing it as a contribution to public discourse related to supporting
or repairing a flawed ideology, which is a system of belief that obstructs an individual’s
ability to gain knowledge within a domain (Stanley, 2015. pp. 52-56). However, this
definition diverges considerably from these precursors by construing propaganda in a
way that highlights how its defining features can be considered from the perspective
of logical reasoning.

Stipulative Definition of Propaganda
Propaganda is an argument—or something that is intended to inspire an argument—
toward a conclusion that a person or people are led to believe is proper, thereby inspiring belief or action, but is actually improper. A proper argument is one that correctly follows the rules of a form of logical reasoning. For example: if the argument is
deductive, it is proper if and only if it is valid and sound; if it is inductive, this means
it is strong and cogent; if it is abductive, this means it is simple, practical, and probable. Moreover, proper arguments are made with consideration paid to all potentially-relevant available information,3 so that potential defeating evidence and counter
2:Such differences are found between the definitions established by various scholars that are discussed
by Ellul’s Men’s Attitudes, Marlin’s Persuasion in pages 7-12, and Stanley in pages 48-53.
3: I will admit that this is an ambiguous notion. I lack a way to state generally what sort of information is or is not relevant to an argument. Pitting an argument against all of the information available
to an individual would be an impossible task, and probably largely pointless—why ensure that an
argument about tomorrow’s weather forecast is consistent with the color of a banana? However, it
is also possible that information that seems irrelevant on the surface could lead to some contradictory implications. Ultimately, we are only human. My point here is that there should be a good faith
effort to consider potential contradictions to an argument when possible. This is a problem shared in
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arguments are accommodated, whether by disproving competing claims or reserving
some skepticism towards the conclusion. By contrast, improper arguments include
invalid deductive arguments, weak inductive arguments, improbable and impractical abductive arguments, arguments predicated on false premises, uncertain forms of
inference that ascribe undue certainty to their conclusions, arguments made in willful
ignorance of an available defeating counterargument, and other forms of fallacious
logic, such as circular reasoning. Any or all of the premises or the conclusion of a
propaganda argument may actually be true or false statements about the world; if all
are true, the problem lies in the connection between them being illogical.
Any informational medium—a thing that is capable of conveying information—
whether it be visual or auditory, artistic or academic, an object, an event, or anything
in between, may act as propaganda, and media that began without a propagandist
purpose may be transformed into propaganda when presented in a certain context.
Any parts of the argument may be explicit in the propaganda or merely implied by,
with the expectation that its audience will receive it in a certain way. Propaganda may
be spread unwittingly, but it seems to require some sort of intention at its inception,
although this intention may not necessarily be malicious or even conscious that it is
producing propaganda. There could be many possible causes behind this propagandaproducing intention, such as a desire to deceive, apathy towards the truth, a belief
that one knows truth despite failure in some epistemic duty, loyalty to some dogma, a
drive for some self-interest, or a desire to legitimately help society. The original propagandist is the person or group that supplies this intention at the time of a propaganda’s
production, while “propagandist” more generally denotes any person, group, or thing
that has the effect of leading, or attempts to lead, a person or people to believe that a
propaganda argument is proper, regardless of the existence of intention. The “propagandee” is the propaganda’s audience, whether intended or actual.
This definition should be understood in relation to a few other terms and concepts.
A propaganda campaign is the coordinated use of multiple separate propagandas to
inspire the same belief or action, or a related set of beliefs or actions. A propaganda regime is such a campaign that achieves a hegemonic status over a society, such that it is
widely accepted and nearly inescapable for those within the society, making refutation
of it a seemingly futile effort.4 A person or people may perceive any information in an
entirely unintended, illogical way, but while such misperception may have essentially
the same effect on them as propaganda, this phenomenon is perhaps better called
mistakenness or misunderstanding than propaganda. True education, understood as
epistemology by responses to the Gettier problem: Gilbert Harman, for instance, said, “It is not at all
clear what distinguishes evidence that undermines knowledge from evidence that does not” (Harman,
2008, p. 204). This problem is also analogous to a problem facing a coherentist theory of knowledge:
what sort of body of beliefs must a belief cohere with for it to be justified? Beliefs that are conceptually relevant, or all other beliefs? (Goldman & McGrath, 2015, pp. 11-12).
4: This concept draws inspiration from the ideas of Antonio Gramsci and Michel Foucault on
hegemonic discourse, referenced by Marlin in his talk of definitions (Marlin, 2013, p. 6); it also
draws significant inspiration from Ellul’s conception of propaganda, most notably what he calls “total
propaganda” (Ellul, 1973, pp. 9-17).
Published by KnightScholar, 2021
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the medium by which a person or people are taught the truth by proper arguments,
is not propaganda. In practical reality, however, education is often difficult to distinguish from propaganda, as propaganda efforts are likely to masquerade as education.
Furthermore, factors such as uncertainty towards the truth of premises in a proper
argument, uncertainty towards the sort of intention at an argument’s origin, and competing propagandas may cause an individual, especially a cynical one, to mislabel true
education as propaganda. Both propaganda and education are forms of persuasion,
understood as the general attempt to inspire belief. Marketing is another form of
persuasion, with the term merely indicating some relationship to commerce. Items of
marketing may fall under either category of education or propaganda. Public relations
is a form of persuasion too, one that denotes a focus on one entity’s perception among
a general public audience.
Propaganda is also related to the concept of knowledge. In epistemology, knowledge is
traditionally defined as a true belief that the believer has a proper undefeated justification for believing (Goldman & McGrath, 2015, pp. 52-56). Under this definition,
propaganda arguments cannot grant a person true knowledge, at least not directly. If
the propaganda is spreading mistruths, then the beliefs it instills are false, and therefore does not provide knowledge. If the argument it presents is improper, whether it
be deductive and invalid, inductive and weak, or otherwise fallacious, but the conclusion is true, it has still failed to provide its audience with a proper justification, and
thereby knowledge, even if they have indeed adopted a true belief. A propaganda
argument can only provide its audience with an unjustified false belief, a justified false
belief, or an unjustified true belief. When it comes to the presentation of information
in logical forms, true education, not propaganda, is the path to real knowledge, to
justified true belief. However, a piece of propaganda may grant knowledge indirectly,
outside of its function as propaganda: for example, it would be reasonable to conclude
from a poster encouraging the public to buy war bonds that a war bonds program exists, and that the nation is in a state of war. Considered in this way, the piece would
serve a secondary educative purpose outside of its primary purpose as propaganda.

The Logical Definition at Work: Interpreting a Piece of
Propaganda
To show how this definition may be used to interpret a piece of propaganda, consider
the following poster, designed by Harry Hopps in 1917 for distribution in the United
States to encourage enlistment for World War I (Hopps, 1918):
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The primary purpose of the poster appears to be to get men to enlist in the military,
indicated by the command at the bottom. This does not mean that the poster only targets men who are able to enlist: indeed, it may sway others to view what the military
is doing more favorably, or encourage them to pressure the men they know who can
enlist to do so, compounding the propaganda’s efficacy. For the sake of brevity, however, I will only focus on a few propaganda arguments the poster intends to convey to
the perspective of a man of enlistment age. The conclusion they are intended to derive
is, “I should (or must) enlist in the military.” The following short, simple argument
can be immediately derived from the text:
1) This mad brute should be destroyed.
2) Therefore, I should enlist.
This argument is invalid and therefore, if intended alone, a propaganda argument.
However, the argument can be made valid if the propagandee is expected to supply a
premise: “If this mad brute should be destroyed, then I should enlist.” But this argument still lacks justification, evidence, and fails to incorporate significant elements
Published by KnightScholar, 2021
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of the poster. A stronger argument intended by the poster should be considered to
determine whether or not it still passes as propaganda.
The large, ape-like character in a pickelhaube, alongside the descriptive “this mad
brute,” are meant to convey a premise that “the Germans are brutes.” The distressed
woman and bloody club, labelled “kultur,” further emphasize that point and provide
some evidence of the atrocity that a brutish German may cause. The poster’s command to “destroy this mad brute” prompts a premise that so-called mad brutes should
be destroyed, a premise that may be supported by societal norms of justice encountered by an individual throughout their lifetime in education and other propagandas.
Other media at the time would have surely indicated that the country is at war against
the Germans, providing another premise; it is therefore unnecessary for the poster to
supply that information. Finally, it is implied through the “enlist” command’s inclusion that an individual’s enlistment will help the nation in its war, and thereby aid the
goal of destroying the Germans. The following is one valid way this argument can be
structured:
1) The Germans are mad brutes that cause harm to others.
2) Mad brutes that cause harm to others should be destroyed.
3) The Germans should be destroyed.
4) If my country is fighting in a war to destroy the Germans and the Germans
should be destroyed, then I should enlist (since I will thereby help the war effort).
5) My country is fighting in a war to destroy the Germans.
6) I should enlist.
The poster conveys an additional, separate argument, one that appeals more to the
propagandee’s self-interest than some high-minded righteousness. The German brute
is shown stepping onto a shore labelled “America,” implying an imminent threat of
invasion. No longer are his atrocities limited to Europe. Now, the propagandee’s own
livelihood is at stake. This second argument may look something like the following:
1) The Germans are going to invade my country.
2) If the Germans invade my country, they are going to threaten my way of
life.
3) If something threatens my way of life, I should fight against it.
4) I should fight against the Germans (which I can do by enlisting).
These two arguments are better justified than the initial invalid one, as their premises
appear to be supported by evidence. If all of their premises are true, they would be
educative rather than propagandist and would render knowledge to their audience, so
150
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long as they correctly interpreted these arguments. However, both of these arguments
contain at least one premise that is arguably false, thereby rendering them unsound
and propagandist.
In the first argument, support for the idea that the Germans are mad brutes, the justification for their destruction, is arguably weak and should thus be treated as false. On
what basis could they be called brutes, insofar as a brute is understood to be something subhuman? The mere drawing featured in the poster of a German as an ape-like
creature is certainly insufficient evidence.
One could use their actions as evidence. It is true that the Germans pioneered some of
the cruelest weapons of the war, including chlorine gas and the flamethrower. However, the allied powers also came to adopt and further develop these weapons. Likewise,
both sides committed abuses against prisoners of war and broke the rules of warfare
set forth by the Hague Conventions. The Germans did undeniably commit numerous atrocities in occupied territories, albeit not to the extremes purported by Allied
propaganda; one could argue that these atrocities outweighed those committed by the
Allies, but, since the Allies—save Russia, who did commit similar atrocities during
their occupation of Austro-Hungarian territories—were never similarly positioned
to occupy German territory in Europe, it is difficult to conclude that they might not
have acted similarly (Kramer, 2017). The Germans are therefore worthy of condemnation, and perhaps retaliatory action, but this is not the same as labelling them as
subhuman brutes.
How else could the Germans be labelled subhuman brutes, since it would be contradictory to call them such for committing acts comparable to those of the Allied powers, who do not label themselves as brutes? If one could identify a few Germans that
are unquestionably mad brutes, that would still be scant proof that every German is a
mad brute. Perhaps the mad brute refers not to the German people, but to the monarchist, autocratic German state. But if that is the case, how could an alliance with
tsarist Russia, an equally oppressive regime led by a cousin of the Kaiser, be justified?
It seems that the brute moniker, and all of the grievous connotations that come with
it, are unearned, applied only because dehumanizing a wartime enemy helps to rally
people to the cause. This argument is consequently propaganda, if only because the
premise calling the Germans brutes, classifying them as sub-human monsters, is too
strong given the available evidence.
In the second argument, the idea that a German invasion of US shores after 1917
is possible, never mind imminent, is weakly supported. Even ignoring the challenge
posed by the U.S. Navy, the Imperial German Navy, having struggled to combat the
British Royal Navy and facing an increasing state of collapse after the 1916 Battle of
Jutland, would have been insufficient to provide the logistical support necessary for a
significant naval invasion of the United States; not to mention how German ground
forces were bogged down in France since the start of the war (Osborne, 2014). A naval
invasion of the United Kingdom, a much closer target, would have still been unrealPublished by KnightScholar, 2021
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istic. Ultimately, this argument rests on fear to incite action, but this fear can only be
inspired by those who are ignorant of the practical realities of warfare and the German
situation. Once the impossibility of a German invasion is realized, the argument is
revealed as propaganda based on blatant lies, considering that the Army, who must be
well-versed in the practical realities of warfare, appears to be promoting it.
There is a third valid argument that could be intended by the poster when considering the trustworthiness of its source, one that is a bit more difficult to definitively call
propaganda:
1) The U.S. government says that I should enlist.
2) The U.S. government is a trustworthy authority in matters of the national
interest, and by extension matters of my own interest.
3) I should adopt the beliefs touted by trustworthy authorities (as they are
probably true) and follow their advice regarding matters relevant to their competencies.
4) I should enlist.
This argument might not be intentional considering the context of the poster. If it is
intended as a possible legitimate interpretation, it is not stressed nearly as much as the
two prior arguments: the only element of the poster that clearly indicates its source is
the faint watermark that says “U.S. Army.” Nothing in the poster appears to purport
the trustworthiness or competency of the U.S. military or government in support of
the second premise, outside of the suggestion that, in this instance, they are doing the
right thing by fighting the German brute—but in that case, the prior two arguments
are advanced anyways, rendering this one pointless.
Maybe support for this controversial second premise is supposed to come from some
other source, as part of a larger campaign. In that case, what evidence could there be?
The evidence cannot come from information propagated by the U.S. government
alone, otherwise all of the arguments would be, “The U.S. government is trustworthy
because the U.S. government says they are trustworthy,” resulting in a logically fallacious circularity. Support for the premise would also be weak if all of the evidence
came from independent sources that had a vested interest in the people believing
in the U.S. government’s trustworthiness, like an empowered political party seeking
reelection or an influential lobbyist group. The government’s historical record could
provide some insight, but the fact that executive officeholders change with each election raises questions over the relevance of a longer-term analysis. However, a lack of
strong supporting evidence does not disprove the statement, either.
The government’s trustworthiness in this expanded context thus seems uncertain and
debatable. If it is true that the government is trustworthy, this argument would be
proper, educative, and provide the propagandee with knowledge. Knowledge derived
from an authority’s word may not be as useful as knowledge justified in other ways,
152
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as it is difficult to draw additional conclusions from such cursory evidence, but it is
still an epistemic justification. Nevertheless, even if this premise could be proven to be
true, the poster would remain as a piece of propaganda altogether due to the presence
of the other arguments.
Just because these arguments are propaganda, however, does not mean that it is false
that men should have enlisted for World War I. Participation in the war may very
well have furthered the nation’s—and consequently its people’s—long-term strategic
interests. Individuals that enlisted could have had the potential to reap certain rewards
from their society for their contribution. It also could be false, though. Perhaps an
isolationist policy would have been sustainable and better for the American people
given the U.S.’s geopolitical situation. For a particular individual, maybe there is a
good physical or mental health reason why they should not enlist, even if they can.
Whether or not a person should enlist to fight in a war is a complicated question.
There is an objective answer as to what is best in terms of certain metrics, but that
answer is often obscured, difficult to determine from the limited information of the
present. A poster like this is unhelpful in trying to determine that answer. A person
needs information that is presented carefully, arguments that are clear and justified
with caveats to highlight exceptions and warn of uncertainties, in order to have any
hope of realizing the truth in an appropriate amount of time.

Defense of the Logical Definition Against Potential
Criticisms
There are some who may criticize this definition and construction of propaganda
for, in their eyes, mischaracterizing propaganda. One such criticism may be over my
inclusion of media and arguments that target individuals, rather than the mass. Certainly, the character of propagandas that target the mass differ greatly from those that
target individuals and smaller groups. Propaganda aimed at the mass must adopt
forms that appeal to the mass, forms that both accommodate and minimize the individual, making them feel significant while also small, by being relatable, identifiable, and empathetic while simultaneously vague and general (Ellul, 1973, pp. 6-9).
Arguments that target other people may play off their particular histories, character
traits, and interests. I do not deny this, but I do deny that this second category is
not propaganda. The motivation for excluding this category seems to be an assertion
that the propagandist is not concerned with winning over particular individuals with
particular efforts, because such efforts are expensive at scale and thereby provide little
value (Ellul, 1973, p. 6). To the contrary, the propagandist may find it valuable to
target certain individuals: namely, leaders within society. If a propagandist can convert
the individuals who other people already trust and follow to their cause, such as politicians, business elites, celebrities, influencers, and the leaders of groups like religious
organizations, trade unions, interest groups, and clubs, they can achieve the effects of
a mass campaign without adopting the character of a mass campaign (Bernays, 1928,
pp. 40-44). Therefore, it seems misguided to exclude those more personal, targeted
Published by KnightScholar, 2021
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techniques from the category of propaganda, even when those techniques are used on
a relatively insignificant individual.
Another objection may concern intention. A critic could argue that, in defining propaganda, the focus should be on how it affects an audience, how it is perceived, not on
its production. I assent that it is important to consider propaganda from the position
of its audience, but defining it from this perspective presents difficulties. For one, I
would question how such an approach would assess pieces of information intended
as propaganda that fail to garner an audience. The inability to identify some propagandas from the audience’s perspective presents another problem. Regardless, I will
consider an example of how propaganda could arise entirely without intention, to see
if this definitional approach is unjustified.
A group of people could conceivably draw some association between two things on
their own, say, between a political party and a color that just so happens to be used
by its members more often than not in promotional materials, without there ever
having been an effort by anyone to intentionally instill that association. Then, they
could simultaneously associate one of those things with a third thing, like that same
color with a soft drink that happens to be that color. This group of people could then
associate the other original thing with that third thing, the political party with the soft
drink, without there being a proper reason to do so. If someone from this group saw a
person drinking the soft drink, they might consequently think of the political party or
illogically assume that the person is associated with the party in some way, influencing
how they behave towards them. As a result, the people in this group would hold the
same beliefs and act the same as if they had been subjected to an intentional campaign
to associate the soft drink with the political party.
I think it is true that a group’s own subconscious creation of illogical associations in
a scenario like this—if it is possible—would have the same effect on them as an intentional campaign. However, I hesitate to relate this process more directly to propaganda. Propaganda seems to involve some kind of subversion or abuse of a person’s
capacity for critical thought, and such subversion or abuse appears to require intention (Marlin, 2013, p. 5). I think that this scenario, which only involves faulty critical
thought, not subversion or abuse, is better characterized as a widespread misunderstanding, as mistakenness, which, if subsumed under the category of propaganda,
would risk overextending the concept of propaganda.
Suppose another possible example of misunderstanding, where a group listened to a
typically trustworthy radio broadcast and heard the message, “The Yankees win and
will go on to the World Series.” From this, they justifiably concluded that the Yankees
must have won and will appear in the World Series. As Yankees fans, they excitedly
shut off the radio and purchased tickets to the World Series. But, unknown to them,
the actual message was, “The Yankees did not win and will not go on to the World
Series.” Interference caused this message to be distorted, cutting out the “did not”
and “not” in a way that made the perceived message seem legitimate, not distorted.
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The fans’ perception of the situation thus resulted in a justified false belief. Could this
misunderstanding rightfully be construed as propaganda, since it affected them the
same way as an intended propaganda could have?
I do not think so. Although successful propaganda is sufficient for unjustified belief
or justified false belief, it is not necessary for either; there are, for example, nonlogical things that can instill and justify belief. If this misunderstanding can be called
propaganda, from where did its logical argument originate? The radio, a non-thinking
thing, could not have formulated such an argument, and the radio host in fact formulated an argument contrary to the message that was perceived. Perhaps you could say
that the fans propagandized themselves, concluding that the Yankees won on a false
premise, that the radio was reliable, in an argument that they invented for themselves.
I am skeptical toward this answer, as its feasibility is rooted in controversial questions
about the nature of the mind, agency, and intention, questions that I cannot resolve
here.5 I do think that it is possible for a person to propagandize themselves using
intention, for instance by intentionally surrounding themselves with certain kinds
of information to protect their sensibilities, as in an echo chamber. However, in this
case, there is no conceivable intention that the fans could have had to risk deceiving
themselves, as deceiving themselves only resulted in them buying tickets to a game
that will certainly disappoint them.6
Finally, there are some objections that may criticize the logically argumentative nature
of this definition of propaganda. One could argue that commands, which are common features of propaganda, are not arguments. I would respond that a person may
need reason to follow the commands present on propaganda. The commands inspire
an argument that a person should or should not do what the command says—therein
lies the argumentation.

5: If a mental process besides intention that creates logical arguments does exist, then the argumentative ideas communicated by this process to the rest of the mind or to others—not the radio or
anything else in the world that inspired these ideas—could perhaps be called propaganda, in which
case you have propaganda that arises without intention. However, I cannot say for certain whether
subsuming such ideas under the category of propaganda would be appropriate. My notion of intention is admittedly somewhat vague, and these are questions that are probably better left to someone
that is better-versed in psychology and the philosophy of mind than myself.
6: I should note that if these fans then went on to intentionally spread their belief that the Yankees
won (e.g. via the argumentation “I heard the Yankees won on the radio; the radio tells the truth; I
heard the radio’s message correctly; therefore the Yankees won.”)—if a misperception is intentionally
communicated, even though the communicator is unaware that they hold such ideas as a result of
misperception and are communicating them because they earnestly believe them to be true—then
such communications could rightfully be called propaganda (as these justified false beliefs have now
actually been formulated as an improper argument), and the fans could be called original propagandists. However, since the ideas they spread originated as justified false beliefs, such original propagandists could probably be called less culpable for their propaganda than those that intentionally lie or
ignore the truth. I imagine that they would quickly stop producing this propaganda once they discovered evidence to the contrary, that the Yankees lost.
Published by KnightScholar, 2021

155

13

Proceedings of GREAT Day, Vol. 2020 [2021], Art. 16

A stronger objection concerns what psychiatrist Vladimir Bekhterev called reflexology
(Marlin, 2013, p. 74). This idea suggests that the aim of propaganda is not typically
to engage the propagandee in a process of rational thought, which they would need
to use to consider logical argumentation. Instead, it is meant to foster a reflexive,
habitual reaction to information, so as to circumvent any rational process that might
uncover its flaws. If this theory explains how much of propaganda works, how could
it be said that it necessarily intends to inspire an argument?
I do not disagree with this assessment. It does not seem that our minds operate purely
on logical processes; for instance, our thinking seems to involve nonlogical processes
like heuristics. So much as a word, like “honor” or “freedom,” may invite a sensational
feeling or habitual connection due to its meaning or regular associations, and those
attributes can influence one’s disposition towards a broader idea (Stanley, 2015, pp.
2-4). Bekhterev’s reflexology provides an explanation for how a lot of propaganda
succeeds.
There is reason to consider staying with the argumentative definition nonetheless.
Even if propaganda may not be intended to be perceived in a logical form, its intended effects can still be expressed in a logical form for the purpose of analysis. Would-be
propagandees who are subjected to this kind of propaganda might still be able to try
to dissect what such a piece is trying to argue to them, if they have not developed a habitual response to its symbols or become curious as to why it expresses some attitude.
This admittedly risks introducing some subjectivity into the analysis of propaganda,
as it is impossible to know with certainty what argumentative mapping the original
propagandist would have agreed is most representative of their message. Yet this is a
problem that arises in any analysis of an author’s intent. Without direct access to the
original propagandist’s mind, it is impossible to know what they intended to say with
certainty, even in propagandas that assume a logical form. Intent can only be extrapolated from the available evidence. Because of this uncertainty, one should try to consider a few of the strongest potential arguments that could be made by the propaganda
when conducting this sort of analysis, involving both as many of the propaganda’s
elements as possible and information that would have readily been available to the
propaganda’s audience in its original context.
That said, the reflexologist’s objection is significant in shedding light on how propaganda subverts, avoids, and abuses a person’s capacity to consider it rationally. If our
minds did operate strictly on the rules of logic, it is difficult to see how propaganda
could be so successful, as we would conceivably be more apt to identify its flaws.
This definition does not seek to diminish this reality; it merely seeks to ascribe these
alternative constructions to an explanation of how propaganda works, rather than an
explanation of what it fundamentally is.
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Propagandist Techniques
So, how does propaganda work? How are people convinced to adopt beliefs that do
not pass logical scrutiny, that lack epistemic justification? There are numerous techniques that achieve this end, which many scholars have explored in depth. Some of
these techniques concern the content of a propaganda argument itself, while others
have to do with the context in which an argument is presented. I will call attention
to a few.
According to Bekhterev, a reflexology response may be achieved through a specific
three-step process. First, the individual is physically exhausted through prolonged
confinement, making them psychologically vulnerable. Next, they are forced to concentrate on a single subject, the propaganda, for an extended period, undermining
their ability to concentrate. Then, the propaganda expresses certain moods, prompting the audience to echo those moods, thereby building reflexive associations between
ideas and emotions (Marlin, 2013, p. 74). This process thereby instills a belief by bypassing the audience’s capacity for logical reasoning. Rallies in Nazi Germany, where
crowds of people stood outside for hours focused on the highly emotive speeches of
Adolf Hitler, provide a good case of reflexology at work (Marlin, 2013, p. 74). Conceivably, this is not the only process that may create such a reflex-response, but just
one example of how it may be achieved.
Propagandas need not always create their own habitual responses. By invoking sacred,
emotionally charged ideas already present in society, propaganda can achieve the same
effect with less of a concentrated effort; in fact, this method is more common than
efforts to create new responses, at least initially in a campaign, as propaganda would
struggle to survive if it contradicted sacred norms (Ellul, 1973, p. 35). Victor Klemperer, a German Jew who lived through the Nazi regime, talks about how he would
speak with people in a school about the meanings of culture, democracy, and other
ideas, and while it appeared that he was making progress in moving them away from
Nazism, all it took was the invocation of heroism, talk of some heroic person or act,
to reverse this progress and render discussion futile (Stanley, 2015, pp. 2-3). The way
that an issue is framed, the ideals that it implicates itself with, will affect the immediate perceptions of the propagandee, thereby biasing them to receive the issue in a
certain way (Marlin, 2013, pp. 96-98).
Propaganda need not even serve the ideals it touts. Stanley establishes a category of
propaganda called undermining propaganda that presents itself as an embodiment of
certain ideals despite effectively eroding them (Stanley, 2015, p. 53). As an example,
he points to the Citizens United case: the Supreme Court extended constitutional
rights to corporations, touting the decision as a defense of democratic ideals of free
expression, while the practical effect of this decision was to erode these ideals by allowing corporations to use their wealth to crowd out smaller, less powerful voices (Stanley, 2015, p. 61). Propaganda can also associate itself with everyday things, rather
than venerated ideals, to achieve this kind of response. If it becomes associated with
a cultural icon, like a celebrity or a buzzword, of which a popular perception already
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exists, that propaganda will likely inherit part of that popular perception, despite a
lack of a logical reason for this association (Marlin, 2013, p. 96).
The use of deceptive language can support propaganda. Linguist Dwight Bolinger
identifies some ways that sentences can be manipulated to change the ideas that they
express. The things left unsaid are as significant as the things that are actually said, but
they are harder to pick up on. Using more passive language that removes an agent—
“Jane kicked the ball” versus “the ball was kicked”—can lighten the perception of that
agent’s responsibility for some event. Using more positive terms, like “surgical strike”
instead of “precision bombing,” can soften the impact of serious news. By omitting
significant information, such as by saying, “It is believed that 10,000 people attended
the rally,” leaving out the fact that this belief was held by a single overly-optimistic
person who cannot count, one can technically tell the truth while conveying a false
impression (Marlin, 2013, p. 99-101). Another example from Eric Swanson shows
how ambiguities and vagueness in language, which he calls failures of shared information, can be utilized. A political campaign could use rhetoric that conjures different
ideas in different people to gain support; for instance, appealing to a vague notion
of freedom could attract the attention of both socialists and laissez-faire liberals, as
both embrace a concept of freedom, but the ways they define freedom differ radically
(Swanson, 2017, pp. 939-941).
Similarly, statistical information can be manipulated to advance improper arguments.
By adjusting the scale of a graph, significant differences or similarities in data can be
visually obscured or implied. Correlations in data can be stressed to improperly suggest causation. Averages can be skewed by adding outliers. Polling data can be biased
by asking leading questions, and an unrepresentative sample of people can be used.
Additionally, data can be outright fabricated, since it will probably take another person a significant amount of time to verify it (Marlin, 2013, pp. 129-134). Statistics
seem to be particularly useful in propaganda since they carry an air of irrefutable scientific fact, one that can obscure the disingenuous mechanisms that may lay at their
source.
Propaganda can assume a form that appears logical at a glance, but is revealed to have
some flaw upon closer examination. Bandwagoning happens when an argument is
meant to be believed on the basis that virtually everyone agrees with it. While consensus among informed agents may provide strong grounds for an inductive argument,
this consensus is meaningless if everyone within the agreeing mass lacks justification
for the belief outside of its being a mass belief. Likewise, adopting a belief after it is
endorsed by a certified expert is inductively reasonable, but propaganda may be presented by people that only have the appearance of being experts, whose credentials are
suspect or who are untrustworthy (Marlin, 2013, pp. 102-105). A long list of logical
fallacies, including ad hominem attacks, post hoc, ergo propter hoc arguments, hasty
generalizations, and begging the question fall under this category, too (Marlin, 2013,
pp. 110-113).
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Many of these techniques show how propaganda uses a distorted version of the truth
to imply a false reality. Propaganda can also plainly lie—argue in defiance of a known
truth—or bullshit—argue with insouciance towards whatever the truth is—but lying
and bullshitting are more dangerous (Cassam, 2018, p. 3). Such claims can be contradicted, proven demonstrably false, damaging the credibility of the propagandist. It is
much better for the propagandist to twist true information, to associate propagandist
goals with irrefutable facts, even if the connection is illogical, and to be able refute
contradictions as mere differences of interpretation (Ellul, 1973, pp. 52-57). When
propaganda does involve blatant falsehoods, it is best if they are presented alongside
an abundance of other information. This information need not be particularly relevant: the goal is to overwhelm the propagandee with more information than they
can practically scrutinize, to exceed their capacity to resist (Ellul, 1973, p. 18). Even
if they find some lies, there is too much other information to contradict—independent arguments that also supposedly support the conclusion—making refutation of
the entire propaganda infeasible. Many will thereby take the propagandist at their
word, trusting that the mass of so-called evidence has at least some truth to it. An example could be a shoddy but lengthy research paper, where people accept the paper’s
conclusion because they only glossed over a hundred pages of dense but nonsensical
language offered as evidence.
A propaganda regime can take overwhelming a propagandee to the extreme. In what
Ellul calls total propaganda, the relentless exposure of an individual to organized
propaganda across different media that pervade an individual’s life, eliminating the
ability to retreat, can capture the mind of the propagandee in its totality, driving them
to accept an idea that lacks proper justification axiomatically ((Ellul, 1973, pp. 9-10).
The propagandist essentially places the propagandee in a sort of Cartesian demon
world, where they have no hope of finding truth and gaining knowledge through typical means. This tends to require an accompanying censorship campaign, as dissenting
views will dramatically weaken the effect of a propaganda regime, although it may be
possible for total propaganda to crowd out other views on its own (Ellul, 1973, pp.
11-12). The destructive power of freedom of information to a propaganda regime can
be seen in the collapse of the Soviet Union. While doubt towards the Communist
party line existed prior, Gorbachev’s policies of glasnost and perestroika enabled the
dissemination of dissent, revealing the extent of Pravda’s mistruths and causing the
people to reject it in favor of newly available alternative sources of information from
the West, hastening the Union’s collapse.

Categories of Techniques: Misdirection and Misinformation
There seem to be two general categories that propagandist techniques can be roughly
broken up into. When it uses appeals to emotions or ideals, associations with popularly-perceived icons, soft language, words with multiple meanings, logical fallacies,
manipulated statistics and data presentations, or an overwhelming amount of distracting information, but all information relevant to the subject matter is available, it
seeks acceptance by distracting the propagandee from their capacity for proper logical
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reasoning, hoping that they are not paying close attention. This first category of techniques can be called misdirection. If a hypothetical perfect logical thinker—who only
accepts beliefs based on their logical reasonableness, is not prone to human conditions
like emotion and habit, and can process an infinite amount of information—were to
analyze propaganda that relies only upon these techniques, they would be able to correctly identify it as propaganda, pointing out the lies, contradictions, or lack of real
evidence present within.
The other category of propagandist techniques relies upon leveraging the propagandee’s ignorance or uncertainty, their lack of knowledge. When it selectively omits
key information that cannot be found in other sources, appeals to authorities that
seem proper to the propagandee but are actually untrustworthy, spreads lies, bullshits,
or fabricates data that cannot be presently disproven, or, at the highest level, encapsulates its audience in an unchallengeable false dogma, even an ideal logical thinker
will struggle to correctly identify the propaganda. This second category of techniques
can be called misinformation. These techniques are typically most effective when the
propagandist is in an epistemically superior position to the propagandee; when the
propagandist has knowledge that the propagandee is known to lack, the propaganda
can be better tailored to appear proper. A censorship campaign might be particularly
useful to a propaganda campaign using misinformation, as the censorship of views
that contradict the propaganda is likely to increase the amount of certainty that propagandees place in it, unless they become aware that a censorship campaign run by the
propagandist exists. Large enough censorship and propaganda campaigns could make
the propagandist the sole source of information for a propagandee, significantly widening the gap in knowledge held by the propagandist vis-à-vis the propagandee and
increasing the possible efficacy of misinformation techniques. So long as a hypothetical perfect logical thinker does not have the knowledge necessary to contradict the
information presented by propaganda using these misinformation techniques, their
ability to correctly identify the propaganda is doubtful. This is a grave problem that
will be explored further shortly.

Categories of Propaganda
Similar to how propagandist techniques can be categorized, propaganda arguments
can be divided into two categories: logically weak forms and logically strong forms.
Note that these “weak” and “strong” monikers do not indicate the likelihood of a
typical propagandee accepting or rejecting the propaganda. Factors like the pull of
emotion and the capacity to process large amounts of information vary from individual to individual. The power of techniques should not be discounted; a particularly
emotionally compelling weak propaganda may garner more attention and acceptance
than a stronger propaganda that uses misinformation. Different forms of propaganda
will naturally work better or worse depending on the nature of the propagandee. Instead, the strength or weakness of propaganda in this context indicates the ability of
the hypothetical perfect logical thinker established prior, serving as propagandee, to
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identify the propaganda as such based on the stipulative definition, based on how its
content presents a logical argument.
For the purpose of categorization, independent arguments made by a single piece
of propaganda should be judged independently, rather than judging the piece as a
whole. When it is possible to place a propaganda argument in multiple categories,
it should be placed in the weakest category that it qualifies for. When an argument
contains multiple flaws or weaknesses within the same category, or additional flaws or
weaknesses indicative of a stronger category, it may be called weaker than other arguments within that category that lack these additional problems, but it should not be
recategorized. When a single piece of propaganda, or a single original propagandist,
advances multiple independent arguments that contradict each other, this does not
affect the categorization of either argument, except in cases where either argument
is supported by a premise that the propagandist is a reliable source of information,
and where one of the contradicting arguments can be accepted as educative—both of
these cases should result in a weak classification of the relevant argument.

Logically Weak Forms of Propaganda
The logically weakest forms of propaganda are those whose argumentative structures
are fundamentally flawed, who fail even when their premises are assumed true. Invalid deductive arguments, where the necessary premises do not lead to the conclusion
or contradict each other, are one example. Inductive arguments based entirely on
premises that lack a connection with the conclusion provide another. Arguments that
contain significant defeating evidence within themselves also fall under this category.
Defeating evidence that is irreconcilable with an argument’s conclusion may not challenge the truth of premises that do support the conclusion, but the acceptance of this
evidence deprives these other premises of their explanatory power, making the entire
argument weak. Additionally, this category includes arguments using uncertain forms
of inference that ascribe absolute certainty to their conclusions. Logicians know to
reject these arguments outright, before evaluating the truth of the premises.
Another weak form of propaganda, approaching something more moderate in
strength, includes arguments that are predicated on at least one false premise and
arguments whose conclusions are defeated by outside evidence, where near-certain
knowledge of this defeating evidence or the falsity of necessary premises is readily
available to the propagandee. This form is stronger than the last because it requires
the propagandee to look outside of the propaganda in order to dismiss it—to outside
evidence or to necessary sub-arguments that the propaganda itself does not engage
with. However, the propagandee must border on certainty in their knowledge of this
outside information in order to still call this form weak.
These weak forms of propaganda may use either misdirection or misinformation techniques, although if they use misinformation, they do so poorly, either including contradictory information within themselves or touting easily refuted lies. Belief in weak
propagandas is always logically unjustified. If the perfect logical thinker were also
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omnipotent, all strong propagandas would appear to be of this second weak variety.
But the perfect logical thinker is meant to be placed in the epistemic position of the
typical propagandee, and most propagandees lack omnipotence. For that reason, logically weak propagandas should be differentiated from those that are logically strong.

Logically Strong Forms of Propaganda
Logically strong forms of propaganda are different from weak forms in that they cannot be fully discounted, either for practical or logical reasons. In order to evaluate
them, these strong forms always require the propagandee to engage with uncertain
forms of inference, like inductive reasoning, as if their propagandizing flaws concerned matters of actual certainty, these flaws would be readily available, and the
perfect logical thinker would not be deceivable. Almost all propagandas of this type
use misinformation techniques.7
A moderate-strong form of propaganda leaves the logical thinker in a position of great
uncertainty. This category includes non-deductive arguments that are advanced by a
dubious source—since they might be omitting some important information—and
arguments that rely on a premise whose truth is only established by a dubious source.
Reasonable grounds to distrust a source include vested interests, a lack of expertise or
experience, and prior unreliability or bias on the part of the source in relation to the
subject matter of the argument (Savellos & Galvin, 2001, p. 40). One hypothetical
example is the case of a historically untrustworthy political party in a one-party state
claiming to have done something good via its foreign policy. The logical grounds for
accepting the argument are weak. However, it is difficult to reject this argument outright, as the argument follows a proper form and there is no stronger evidence available to suggest that the premises or conclusion are not true. The political party might
be telling the truth, and there is no alternative source for this kind of information
available that is more trustworthy. This propaganda could also thrive in multi-party
states, if all of the political parties are equally untrustworthy and in continual disagreement. If three or four known liars are making equally plausible conflicting arguments, it is impossible to logically determine which one of them, if any, to believe.
The logical thinker is doing their epistemic duty best by remaining skeptical, refusing
to pass a judgement. However, absolute skepticism is often infeasible. If the logical
thinker is prompted to act on a dubious set of information, skepticism does not seem
to always justify inaction, as inaction may carry graver consequences than action. The
7: The only exception that I can conceive of is the case discussed in footnote 6: propagandas that
are created when an individual communicates a justified false belief that does not arise from another
propaganda. Such cases need not necessarily involve any technique; since the original propagandist
legitimately thinks they are spreading the truth, and is justified in thinking so as long as they have
not failed any epistemic duty (e.g. has properly considered potential defeating evidence), they are
neither lying nor bullshitting. Still, this appears to be a fringe case, and propagandas of this type seem
unlikely to persist—the example in footnote 6 would probably be resolved quickly once the fans
encounter overwhelming defeating evidence, and would learn to be more skeptical about the radio’s
messages thereafter.
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logical thinker may have to make a choice more or less at random. The best they can
do is make preparations for the possibility that their decision was the wrong one.
The strongest forms of propaganda present themselves as fully proper arguments
backed by strong sources, causing the logical thinker to accept them with a high
degree of confidence. To illustrate how this can work: a well-respected, trustworthy
authority in the environmental scientific community might break from character after accepting a backroom bribe, deciding to provide falsified evidence in support of a
land development plan, which has been embroiled in controversy due to fears over its
environmental impact. Objectively, this scientist is not trustworthy, at least not when
they are being offered large sums of money to settle controversial issues. However,
from the perspective of a propagandee who cannot test the environmental impact of
the plan themselves, there is no logical reason to distrust them if they have settled past
controversies truthfully, since they do not know about the bribe. If they have a say in
approving the plan, they should greenlight it, barring some other reason for rejection.
Even if the scientist’s evidence is proven incorrect, it might not be justified to discount
them in all future environmental controversies if they have a strong record overall, as
this instance could appear to have been the result of an honest mistake. Unless direct
evidence of the bribe or forgery came to light, the supposition that they have been
corrupted from a single instance would be an illogical conspiracy theory. Without access to additional information, there is no way to logically identify strong propaganda
from the propagandee’s perspective, at least not until after we have accepted it and
suffered its consequences.

Resistance to Propaganda
With these distinctions and attributes of propagandas in mind, we can begin to consider how they might be resisted by an individual subjected to them, so that their negative epistemic influence is reduced. This is a topic that calls for additional research;
an entire project of equal length to this one could be dedicated to discussing how a
single type of propaganda might be resisted. I can only offer a cursory glance at some
considerations for the ways that the epistemic effect of propaganda can be mitigated.
Resistance to Weak Forms
The first step to reducing the influence of propaganda from the perspective of a propagandee is to recognize propaganda for what it is, to unmask it. That is where the logical definition of propaganda developed in this project becomes practically relevant. By
taking informational media that have been created or affected by a mind, the source
of intention, which consequently might carry some message intended to be received
by the propagandee, and analyzing them from a logical perspective, by breaking down
their contents and seeing how they form certain arguments, one can hope to at least
unveil logically weak forms of propaganda.
Two problems emerge: First, virtually anything that has been influenced by another
person—whether a textbook, a lecture, an academic journal, a painting, a sculpture, a
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piece of music, a graph, a public performance, the color of a product, the context in
which an otherwise benign object is placed—could serve a propagandist purpose. It
would be impossible for a person to analyze every informational medium, every potentially propagandist item, that they encounter in this way, even if they knew which
media have and have not been affected by people. Second, a propagandee cannot
directly perceive the intentions of other minds that produce propaganda. There is uncertainty in knowing which messages are actually intended and which a propagandee
has mistakenly perceived for themselves as a result of exposure to an informational
medium.
How can these problems be circumvented? For the first problem, a more manageable
list of things that a person should analyze in this way, based on the likelihood that
these things will include propaganda and have a practical effect on one’s life or society,
must be constructed. An individual might be inclined to start by analyzing things
that seem to have a noticeable impact on their beliefs, especially those beliefs that are
foundational to motivating other beliefs or substantial actions. It would be a waste
of time to analyze ineffective or inconsequential propagandas. However, some propagandas find success by virtue of their subtlety: they affect belief without calling much
conscious attention to themselves. An individual therefore must occasionally look to
informational media that initially appear more benign as well. Things that seem to
invoke some propagandist technique, like media that incite some emotion, may be
more likely to be propaganda, and thus may be deserving of particular attention.
Another list of things worth evaluating could be based on their known origin. Certain
people or organizations, particularly those in a position to gain from people holding certain beliefs, like an elected official or a company behind a new product, may
be more likely to produce propaganda. Such a list could then be further refined by
establishing the trustworthiness of particular individuals or organizations, based on
the frequency of their messages being educative or propagandist. One would then be
justified in approaching the claims of established sources with initial belief or doubt,
only fully analyzing their claims occasionally to check for change, making room to
evaluate the claims of newcomers.
A list might also be established by topic: propaganda might be produced for certain
topics, like causes for warfare, more often than others, and certain topics might have
a greater relevance to one’s life or society than others. Certain kinds of media could
be more conducive to communicating propaganda, too. By developing such lists, a
propagandee could prioritize analyzing more impactful and more suspect informational media, thereby unmasking and reducing the influence of more propagandas
that have a greater negative epistemic impact than one who analyzes informational
media at random.
As for the second problem, it is true that, without an original propagandist’s commentary—which is unlikely to come to light, especially in cases where they are seeking
malevolent or selfish ends—it can be difficult to know the intended message within
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an informational medium, if there is one, with a high degree of certainty. Still, the
author’s intent may be discernable by using clues within a supposed propaganda’s
content and original context. Necessarily intentional elements, like words in a poster
or cartoon, might be discernible from potentially accidental elements, like vague facial
expressions or backgrounds. If so, it makes sense to focus on the intentional elements
and include as many of them as possible in a complete mapping of the propaganda’s arguments. Consider the source, if available: the supposed original propagandist
might have interests that are naturally apparent, and certain arguments may serve
these interests better than others. When multiple informational media share a source,
there could be a common trend among their messages. A piece might be clearly intended for a certain audience, or could have multiple messages intended for different
audiences that perceive it. The propaganda may anticipate and appeal to the typical
beliefs of such intended audiences, so these beliefs may form part of the propaganda’s
argument.
Confidence that a certain message is intended may be increased by having multiple
people independently analyze the piece, especially if those people are from different backgrounds and are not biased to think that the piece must be or must not be
intended for them. Evaluating multiple interpretations is probably a good thing, at
least for epistemic purposes, as even if one of the messages being considered was unintended, better classified as a misinterpretation than a propaganda or educative argument, considering it on its logical merits alone is likely to give the analyst knowledge
regarding its substance.
Once a weak propaganda argument is unmasked, it can be refuted on the basis of its
clear improperness. Still, this may be easier said than done—the perfect logical thinker only exists as a hypothetical. Social pressures to conform and other practical considerations may make it rational for an individual to continue to accept propaganda, at
least publicly, although the public act of accepting it may cause them to truly believe
in it over time. Psychological phenomena that propaganda techniques appeal to, like
emotion and habitual responses, may also make it difficult for an individual to fully
relinquish belief in a propaganda.
Resistance to Strong Forms
When it comes to strong forms of propaganda, the propagandee faces even greater difficulties in resisting them. Regarding moderate-strong forms, they encounter the same
issues in discovering them as they do with weak forms. However, it becomes even
more difficult for the propagandee to abandon a moderate-strong propaganda after
it is found; it cannot be practically discounted, since there are no logically superior
alternatives to turn to and agnosticism on the propaganda’s subject may be impractical
or logically undesirable.
The strongest forms of propaganda appear almost impossible to resist. Since they leverage the fact that the propagandee lacks the knowledge necessary to recognize them,
they cannot be unmasked, as they appear indistinguishable from proper educative
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arguments. If they cannot even be identified, how could they be resisted? Consider
then a society captured by this kind of propaganda, as in the case of Ellul’s total propaganda, something that a person born in Nazi Germany might have experienced had
that regime persisted for a few generations and succeeded in its terrible designs. That
individual, the regime’s perpetual propagandee, would scarcely be better off than the
subject of Descartes’ evil demon when trying to gain knowledge about subjects where
propaganda is necessary to legitimizing the regime—the individual’s logical reasoning
would continually lead them to false conclusions, as the only evidence available to
them would have been carefully crafted to deceive them. They might assume educative arguments to be a weak form of propaganda, as they have been so convinced of
certain false beliefs that they accept them as axioms. Such an individual could adopt a
true belief by supposing that the regime is lying, but this idea would be a speculative
conspiracy theory without evidence, making belief in this idea unjustified, a lucky
guess at the truth, not knowledge. The epistemic prospects of this individual appear
considerably limited.
Perhaps there exists some nonlogical means that could root out these propagandas
more often than not, but what could these means be? I cannot conceive of any approach to information that could be more reliable in discerning truth from falsehood than logical reasoning. This possibility aside, only a position of total skepticism,
where the individual adopts an agnostic, noncommitted position towards all ideas by
jettisoning all beliefs—except for those that are necessarily true, like a belief in selfexistence—would ensure that a person is totally protected from the influence of propaganda; but it cannot be justified to adopt this position. The motivation for resisting
propaganda here is to curb its negative epistemic effect on individuals, its ability to
prevent them from gaining knowledge and inculcate them with unjustified or false
beliefs. Total skepticism would throw out the bulk of real knowledge alongside propaganda. That position would only appear to be justifiable if it is worse for an individual
to hold a preponderance of false and unjustified beliefs than no beliefs at all and it is
true that propagandas tend to capture the individual more often than real knowledge.
A skeptic encounters a paradox if they justify their skepticism in this way. They need
to believe that people are probably more prone to propaganda than knowledge, yet
they cannot seem to hold this belief without abandoning their skepticism. This paradox aside, I argue it is more reasonable to disbelieve the premise that strong propagandas tend to capture people more often than real knowledge. If this were the case,
it would seem to me that the history and continued survival of humanity could only
be explained as an accident, or as an inevitability thanks to some outside force, two
explanations I consider to be unlikely. Our understanding of the deeper mechanisms
at play might be muddled and inaccurate, but the practical utility of many ideas—our
ability to predict outcomes and act accordingly, the mere ability of many of us to survive for eighty years, never mind our technological progress—seems to suggest that we
do hold more knowledge than propaganda, at least concerning matters of significance
contained within this reality. Selective skepticisms towards specific topics where we—
either as a collective or individuals—appear less certain in our knowledge, or where
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agnosticism might be preferable to taking a position, are justified: for example, I know
that, having never studied theoretical physics in depth, my understanding of string
theory is probably shoddy, and so I choose to take no position on whether the theory
is likely true or false, especially since my life will probably remain practically unaffected no matter what position or non-position I take. But these selective skepticisms
must be formed on the basis of some knowledge, otherwise their random adoption
risks throwing out knowledge and its practical effects at the same rate as propaganda.
We must therefore accept the risk that we are sometimes being deceived by strog
propagandas. Perhaps the best way for an individual to compensate for this reality
without creating larger epistemic problems for themselves is by holding on to the
possibility that any of their beliefs may be wrong, by remaining flexible and adjusting
their beliefs according to the newest proper evidence as it emerges. Still, this could be
infeasible. Going back to constantly reevaluate the veracity of your beliefs is a laborious task. It might be necessary for individuals to hold some beliefs axiomatically, even
if such certainty is unjustified, in order for them to gain further knowledge within a
field.
Resistance to Propaganda at the Societal Level
The prospects of an individual attempting to avoid propaganda entirely seem rather
grim, but perhaps solutions can be found at the societal level, outside of the individual. Such solutions could strive to either reduce the ability of people to produce propaganda, reduce their interest in creating it, increase the ability or interest in producing
real education, or increase the public’s awareness of or ability to resist propaganda.
One significant debate focuses on the epistemic benefits of free speech versus the censorship of propaganda. Even though it will allow for the production of propaganda,
free speech might carry epistemic benefits for a society: for example, the proliferation
of improper arguments could be necessary to practicing and strengthening proper
argumentation, while censoring propaganda could weaken our defenses against censored ideas and make them more alluring (Smart, 2018, p. 10-11). However, there is
no guarantee that propaganda will not overwhelm a system with legally protected free
speech, and it may be impossible to eliminate social pressures for conformity, allowing for propagandas to still attain a hegemonic status, stifling knowledge. Meanwhile,
the effectiveness of censoring propaganda is reliant upon the reliability of the censors,
who must have both the ability to identify propaganda and a genuine interest in censoring it. While censors may have access to additional information that puts them in a
better position to identify propaganda than the average propagandee, an organization
with the power to censor could be open to corruption and abuse. Censorship can be
used to support propaganda as effectively as it can be used to support knowledge, if
not more so.
Another way that a society could counter propaganda is by reducing epistemic inequality, since misinformation relies upon the propagandee’s ignorance relative to the
propagandist. Jason Stanley suggests that economic equality is a means to this end.
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Economic inequality makes people ignorant to the lived experiences of other classes,
and furthermore causes them to dogmatically defend what they see as their class’s interests out of economic anxiety (Stanley, 2015, p. 19). Reducing economic inequality
would thus both reduce the differences in knowledge between groups of people that
propaganda can exploit and mitigate a source of propaganda, since there would no
longer be a widespread interest in producing propagandas to protect classist interests.
Sponsoring publicly-accessible true education would be another means of reducing
epistemic inequality, although, just as in the case of censorship, it carries a risk. If the
sponsors of such education struggle to discern propaganda themselves, or have an
interest in spreading propaganda, then they may, intentionally or not, contribute to
the dissemination of propaganda in a society. Classes that teach people about logical
reasoning could improve their ability to recognize and resist weak propagandas.
A more controversial means of eliminating propaganda might involve eliminating
rights to privacy. If a truly trustworthy state actor had access to and recorded every
action committed by every individual, the state would have far more evidence that it
could use to discern propaganda from knowledge, enabling them to censor or expose
propagandists. Alternatively, every citizen could be given such access to every other
citizen, so that anyone could make such determinations. If there were some way to
read people’s thoughts, memories, and intentions using technology, the production of
many types of propaganda, particularly those that are intentionally deceptive for the
propagandist’s benefit at the propagandee’s expense, would be virtually impossible.
Finally, the fields of virtue and vice epistemology might reveal how the attitudes
and dispositions of individuals could be changed—either on a mass scale via social
pressures or by a person themselves—so that people are more naturally resistant to
propaganda. For example, dogmatism, the habit of clinging to a rigid set of ideas
even if they are challenged, is an epistemic vice that has an overall effect of preventing an individual from gaining knowledge, even if it protects some knowledge from
propagandist attacks (Beatson et al., 2019, p. 49-50). Cultivating more of a healthy
skepticism or ideological flexibility in lieu of dogmatism may eliminate the ability of
propagandas to use dogmatic beliefs as a vector, and may make educative arguments
more likely to succeed over propaganda.
Of course, these solutions are only some cursory suggestions, potential remedies. I
have not considered their efficacy on any basis other than the possibility that they
might liberate a society’s individuals from the influence of propaganda, enabling them
to gain more knowledge. Some of these solutions, like ending rights to privacy, are
certainly ethically dubious, and therefore probably should not be adopted. Others
might be impractical or impossible to implement, either from a technical or policy
standpoint—for example, attempts to alter school curricula might face significant
pushback from teachers or parents. Some of these solutions may even have a negative
epistemic effect at a collective level: for example, from the perspective of the idea of
Mandevillian intelligence in social epistemology, a system may be able to gain more
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knowledge overall if some of its epistemic agents have certain epistemic vices that
cause them to produce propaganda (Smart, 2018, p. 10-11, 15-16). Paradoxically, a
bit of propaganda that limits the knowledge of some individuals might increase the
availability of knowledge to a society overall. The value of the ability for individuals
to gain knowledge must be weighed vis-à-vis these other considerations if one seeks to
appraise the full impact of a proposed change on an individual or society.

Concluding Remarks
When I began this project, I had hoped to find some way to conclusively identify
propaganda, so that I could avoid it and develop opinions for myself that were better
informed. I believe that I have at least found some success in this goal. I have found
a way to describe propaganda objectively and, in doing so, have revealed how many
propaganda can be identified and avoided. As a result, I have been able to begin
reevaluating the standing of some of my own beliefs, to consider how I adopted them
and the legitimacy of the arguments made in support of them, so that I can find better grounding for them, reject them when counterarguments appear more proper, or
develop a healthy degree of skepticism around them when all appears uncertain.
Yet I cannot help but feel somewhat dissatisfied. To be secure in all of our beliefs, to
resist propaganda entirely without jettisoning real knowledge alongside it, borders on
the impossible: it would either require omniscience or the absence of propagandist
intentions from the world. Even resisting logically weak forms of propaganda presents
major challenges, rooted in the practical but limited nature of the human psyche
and non-epistemic concerns. Furthermore, if such weak propaganda is successfully
resisted, the issue of truth remains. Proving an argument to be flawed does not prove
its conclusion to be false. Educative arguments still must be discovered on their own,
adding to the work necessary to gain true knowledge. It seems to me that, while we
can actively work to curb its influence, we are ultimately destined to live with propaganda, that there will never be a way to eliminate propaganda altogether.
One might place hope in the future, believing that advancements in technology will
make propaganda easier to reveal or harder to produce. I am more pessimistic about
the future’s prospects. I am a member of the first generation to be raised entirely in
the context of a popularized and accessible internet, which has enabled instant access
to insane amounts of information and fostered the development of a truly global mass
culture. On one hand, the internet has made it easier than ever before to learn new
skills, conduct research, share one’s findings, and interact with other people, suggesting that it has the potential to spread knowledge to all, to reduce propaganda’s influence. However, the internet has simultaneously made it easier to disseminate propaganda, obscure the source of information, and confirm one’s own biases, as evidence
for virtually any belief can be found online, alongside a community of people espousing said beliefs. Meanwhile, other technologies have enabled the production of more
convincing fabrications, like deep fakes, that can be used to support propaganda. The
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mere existence of this technology casts doubts upon genuine evidence as well, making
the truth more difficult to discern.
That said, I am not convinced that technology will necessarily make it harder to
gain knowledge in the future, either. Technologies present opportunities to enhance
both education and propaganda. I believe that our real epistemic future will be determined by how society reacts to these technological changes culturally, socially, and
politically, and by how these reactions accommodate or complicate the production
and consumption of propaganda versus education. We have some ability to affect
the conditions of our future, and we should seek one that includes our betterment,
whatever that betterment may entail. I cannot claim to know what we should do to
achieve a better future, except that I know that the best way we can realize substantial
solutions is through perception, reflection, and discussion of the evidence available
to us. Therefore, I argue that we must continuously explore, consider, and debate the
topics touched on by this project and the multitude of perspectives on them, and take
action to advance what we know to be the right response once we are secure in that
knowledge to the best of our ability. I can only hope that I have made a positive contribution to that effort here, that I have succeeded in rendering, both for myself and
for you, the reader, some knowledge about propaganda.

Appendix

The appendix includes interpretations, per the stipulative definition, of additional
real pieces of propaganda, similar to the interpretation of the World War I poster
in the main body of the text. The interpretations here should not be considered exhaustive of the propaganda arguments contained in each respective piece. They are
included to show how propaganda can be found and analyzed across a wide variety of
informational media. The appendix is located in the online edition of Proceedings of
GREAT Day 2020, found at https://knightscholar.geneseo.edu/proceedings-of-greatday/vol2020/iss1/16.
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